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COMMENTS
STONE v. GRAHAM: A FRAGILE DEFENSE
OF INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOUS AUTONOMY
"The day that this country ceases to be free for irrelig-
ion it will cease to be free for religion-except for the sect
that can win political power.""
INTRODUCTION
No earthly institution is more vital or central to the
human condition than is religion. Religion serves as the vehi-
cle by which man formulates moral and theological guidelines
that are used to govern and interpret daily human existence.
Because of this pivotal role religion has played in the develop-
ment of civilization, history abounds with examples of men
and women zealously fighting to secure and preserve their own
religious autonomy.
Nowhere has this struggle for religious freedom been
more fundamental to social evolution than in the United
States.2 Because Americans are, as Justice Douglas wrote, "a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing,"' they have been particularly vigilant in their search for
religious individuality and equality. Perhaps in agreement
with the sentiment later expressed in Nietzsche's maxim,
"[c]onvictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than
lies,"' 4 the framers of the Constitution sought to insure reli-
gious autonomy through the broad dictates of the first amend-
ment,5 a provision premised on the assumption that certain
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1972); C.
BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1930); W. SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA (1930).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1951).
W. KAUFMANN, THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 63 (2d ed. 1968).
6 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I, cl. 1.
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provinces of human speculation should be afforded immunity
from the shifting tides of political fortune. Justice Jackson's
assertion with regard to the Bill of Rights is particularly ap-
plicable to the religion clauses of the first amendment: "The
very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."'6
Americans have been especially cautious to prevent any
form of religious hegemony to enter the classrooms of the
public schools. As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools,"' and a strong
feeling exists that the public schools, as provinces of the edu-
cational training of children, should forever be free from sec-
tarian influence.' Because of this philosophy, American courts
have shown little hesitation in striking down laws deemed to
contravene the religious autonomy of public school students.
The United States Supreme Court recently ventured once
again into this sensitive area of jurisprudence with its decision
in Stone v. Graham.9 In Stone, a closely divided Court 0 is-
sued an opinion reversing a ruling by the Kentucky Supreme
Court concerning the constitutionality of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) section 158.178. Referred to here as the Ten
Commandments Act, this statute required that a copy of the
Ten Commandments be placed by the state government in all
elementary and secondary school classrooms in Kentucky.1
6 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
7 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
8 W.O. DOUGLAS, THE BIBLE AND THE SCHOOLS 58 (1966).
o 49 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980).
10 Although the Court split five votes to four, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun dissented solely on the ground that the case should be given plenary con-
sideration. Id. at 3370.
" The text of the statute reads as follows:
(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, pro-
vided sufficient funds are available as provided in subsection (3) of this sec-
tion, to ensure that a durable, permanent copy of the Ten Commandments
shall be displayed on a wall in each public elementary and secondary school
classroom in the Commonwealth. The copy shall be sixteen (16) inches wide
by twenty (20) inches high.
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation
concerning the purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular application
1980-81]
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By way of rather perfunctory opinions,12 the members of the
equally-divided Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the statute,
finding that the law contravened neither the state nor the fed-
eral constitution.'3 The United States Supreme Court dis-
agreed, however, ruling that the motivation for the law was
religious rather than secular in nature and thus violated the
first amendment. 4
This comment contends that the United States Supreme
Court, while reaching a correct result in Stone, artlessly and
imcompletely applied the traditional constitutional test estab-
lished by the Court for application in establishment clause
cases. Furthermore, the scope of the decision reflects an insen-
sitivity to the present uncertain state of American political
and judicial evolution. Prior to the Stone decision, one com-
mentator said the Ten Commandments Act was so blatantly
unconstitutional as to deserve only cursory attention;"" how-
ever, the legal issues involving the interaction of government
and religion in the public schools cannot be so summarily dis-
missed. Rather, a searching examination of the traditional an-
alytical structure devised and applied by the Supreme Court
in establishment clause cases is called for. Such a rigorous in-
quiry is not manifested in the Stone decision, and, therefore,
this comment will attempt a more exhaustive examination of
establishment clause law as applied to the facts in Stone and
of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamen-
tal legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States."
(3) The copies required by this section shall be purchased with funds
made available through voluntary contributions made to the state treasurer
for the purpose of this section.
Ky. RE v. STAT. § 158.178 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
12 The opinions are remindful of Justice Harlan's observation in an earlier estab-
lishment clause case:
I think it deplorable that this case should have come to us with such an
opaque opinion by the State's highest court. With all respect that court's
handling of the case savors of a studied effort to avoid coming to grips with
this anachronistic statute and to "pass the buck" to this Court.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114-15 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
13 599 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1980).
14 Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980).
" Comment, Separation of Church and State: Education and Religion in Ken-
tucky, 6 N. Ky. L. REv. 125, 151 (1979).
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will suggest an alternative analysis more consistent with prior
Supreme Court rulings.
I. SUPREME COURT EXPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
In order to receive judicial sanction, a statute such as the
Ten Commandments Act must withstand scrutiny under the
establishment clause"6 of the first amendment. 17 The United
States Supreme Court, in wrestling with a number of cases
involving religion and government interaction over the past
forty years, has devised a test to be used in establishment
clause cases, a test that reflects the Court's quest for preserva-
tion of religious autonomy.
This test has developed in a piecemeal fashion.1 8 The
starting point and background for Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on the establishment clause is Everson v. Board of Ed-
ucation,9 decided in 1947. Despite upholding the use of pub-
lic funds for transportation of parochial school students,20
16 In analyzing the case history of religion in the public schools, this comment
does not focus on the free exercise clause of the first amendment as this is the ap-
proach the Supreme Court has taken, despite the suggestion of several commentators
that the Court should view the religion clauses as a unit. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTONAL LAW 813-23 (1978); Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the Su-
preme Court: The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L. REv.
207, 212 (1978); Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of
the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561, 564 (1980). Contra, Katz, Freedom of
Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953); Kauper, Church and
State: Cooperative Separation, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-18 (1961). This controversy is
beyond the scope of this comment, and the focus here will be on the establishment
clause only. It should be noted, however, that the Court's concern with free exercise
values has played an important role in the development of the current establishment
clause test. See note 25 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the in-
fluence of free exercise values.
17 A number of cases clearly establish that the first amendment is applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 215-17 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18 See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment: Part II, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 529-90 (1968); Pevar, Public Schools Must Stop
Having Christmas Assemblies, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 327, 339-44 (1980); Comment,
Educational Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11 PAC. L.J.
1061, 1069-71 (1980).
1, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
20 Id. at 17.
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Justice Black's majority opinion enunciated a strict separation
or "no aid" standard21 reminiscent of Jefferson's proverbial
"wall of separation between Church and State."22
This no-aid standard proved to be short-lived, however,
and subsequent Court decisions reflected a retreat from the
rigid philosophy of Everson.2 A strict separation theory be-
came unrealistic in a complex, modern society where extensive
government actions and intrusions are the norm. 4 Further-
more, the inflexible requirement of Everson failed to encom-
pass the freedom from governmentally-imposed burdens en-
visioned by the free exercise clause.25 Thus, the wall of
separation constructed by Justice Black in Everson became a
"blurred, indistinct and variable barrier, 2  and the Court
proceeded to construct a standard that would take into ac-
count the necessary accommodation between religious institu-
11 Mr. Justice Black pronounced in dicta the following statement, which has
become the most influential assertion in establishment clause cases:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16.
212 A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMIAS JEFFER-
SON 332 (1944).
33 The holding in Everson itself was not logically consistent with Justice Black's
no-aid standard. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
24 Giannella, supra note 18, at 514-15; Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter
and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 147, 151.
25 The Court noted this factor in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, (1970):
"Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement
that would tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental
restraint on religious practice." Id. at 669-70 (emphasis added).
28 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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tions and the state.
This notion of accommodation arose first from the inter-
action of two decisions that soon followed Everson. In McCol-
lur v. Board of Education,27 the Court struck down a pro-
gram whereby school officials released children from classes
for religious instruction within the school buildings.28 Relying
upon the use of school property as the dispositive distinction
in McCollum, the Court's decision in Zorach v. Clauson2 ' up-
held a similar program where the children received the reli-
gious instruction off school property.30 The Zorach majority
opinion asserted that it was not impermissible for the schools
to "accommodate their schedules for a program of outside re-
ligious instruction. '3 1
This recognition of a zone of permissible accommodation
resulted in the enunciation of what has come to be the pre-
vailing philosophical posture of the Court in establishment
clause adjudication, .a philosophy that can be characterized
best as judicial "neutrality. 3 2 The Court first effectuated this
nebulous concept of neutrality in Abington School District v.
Schempp.3 3 Striking down the practice of prayer and biblical
devotional exercises in public classrooms,M the Court sought
to crystalize the philosophy of neutrality by means of a bifur-
cated test that required a law to have both a secular purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.3 5
Walz v. Tax Commissioner,6 a 1970 decision, expanded
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
28 Id. at 212.
29 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
30 Id. at 315.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
31 Throughout the establishment clause cases, the Court has declared allegiance
to this philosophy of neutrality. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
747 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). However, as Justice Harlan noted,
"[N]eutrality is ... a coat of many colors." Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
249 (1968) (Harlan J., concurring). Many variations of this neutrality concept are
available. See TamE, supra note 16, at 820-21; Gianella, supra note 18, at 513-22.
33 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34 Id. at 224.
31 Id. at 222.
38 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
1980-811
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the scope of the Schempp test. Upholding state tax exemp-
tions for church property,3 7 Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion sought to further clarify the Court's conception of
neutrality and the need for church-state accommodation in
establishment clause cases.38 The opinion formulated an addi-
tional criterion, forbidding excessive entanglement between
church and state."
The standards set forth in Schempp and Walz were fused
in Lemon v. Kurtzman" in 1971 to form the tripartite test
used by the Court in establishment clause cases to this day.
Declaring a state law allowing the purchase of services from
church-related elementary and secondary schools to be uncon-
stitutional,4' Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion set forth
the criteria that have been used in all subsequent cases
involving church-state interaction in education:4 2 "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion." 43
Though a number of lower courts have used the Lemon
test in cases of religious activities in public schools or other
public areas," the Court, until Stone, had been presented
37 Id. at 675.
"See note 25 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this concern on
the part of the Court.
39 397 U.S. at 674.
-0 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41 Id. at 625.
42 See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 948 (1980); Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413
U.S. 472 (1973).
"I Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as
the Lemon test].
44 See, e.g., Meltzer v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 576-77 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 577 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (involved distribution of Bibles in public schools); Ring
v. Grand Forks Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 483 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980) (involved use
of the Ten Commandments in public schools); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 480 F.
Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (involved use of public funds in construction of platform
for papal visit); Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (involved use of
university buildings for religious meetings). But see Anderson v. Salt Lake City
[Vol. 69
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only with cases involving public aid to sectarian schools as fo-
rums for application of the tripartite test.45 In light of this
background, the use of the Lemon test in the Stone decision
represents a significant feature of the ruling and symbolizes
the Court's continued allegiance to the establishment clause
analysis that has evolved over the past four decades. Thus,
recognizing that the Lemon test criteria should be viewed
"only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which
the objectives of the establishment clause have been im-
paired, ' 4 '6 this comment will examine the use of this test in
Stone and will offer an alternative analysis of the issues
presented by that case.
II. SECULAR LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Dating from the landmark decision of McCulloch v.
Maryland,7 the Supreme Court has had the difficult task of
ascertaining legislative motives. In McCulloch, Chief Justice
Marshall asserted that the Court would be forced to overturn
a legislative action "should Congress, under the pretext of ex-
ecuting its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of ob-
jects not entrusted to the government. ' 4 Subsequently the
job of reading the minds of legislators has become one of the
more frequent and demanding of the Court's duties.49
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 87 (1973) (involved mono-
lith on city property with inscriptions including the Ten Commandments); Kent v.
Comm'r of Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass. 1980) (involved period of prayer in public
schools).
5 It should be noted that the Court has on occasion strongly indicated that the
Lemon test should be utilized in all establishment clause cases. See Meek v. Pit-
tinger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
772 (1973).
"' Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975). It should be noted here that al-
though the Lemon test has been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, not all
current justices agree upon its effectiveness. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan,
444 U.S. 948, 955-56 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works
Bd. 426 U.S 736, 767-70 (1976) (White, J., concurring). For one commentator's analy-
sis of how the different members of the Court construe the establisment clause in
cases of public aid to parochial education, see W. PETERSON, THY LIBERTY IN LAW 157
(1978).
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
46 Id. at 423.
4' For extensive discussion of the scope and legitimacy of this Court function, see
1980-811
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As noted earlier, this inquiry into legislative motivations
became part of establishment clause adjudication by means of
the test formulated by the Court in Schempp. 0 Of the three
criteria in the Lemon test, however, the requirement of a sec-
ular legislative purpose has been the least important tool for
finding a statute unconstitutional. 51 Rarely has this require-
ment been determinative of establishment clause claims,52 and
the most succinct characterization of the Court's actions in
this area perhaps came from the New Jersey Supreme Court
when it declared that "[flor an enactment to pass the test of
having a secular purpose, little more is required than a rea-
sonable legislative statement announcing a colorable secular
design."5
Given this background, the most remarkable facet of the
Stone decision is the Court's sole reliance upon this prong of
the Lemon test in striking down the Ten Commandments Act.
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legis-
lative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
50 See text accompanying note 35 supra for recognition of the secular purpose
test in Schempp.
" For explanations of the basic reasons for this development, see TamE, supra
note 16, at 835; Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administra-
tive Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1178-81 (1974).
" Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) are the only cases prior to Stone that were decided upon
the grounds of the secular purpose test. Labeled as defunct by some commentators
(see Note, supra note 51, at 1200), the weakness of the secular purpose test and its
perceived relationship to the primary effect test was perhaps best phrased by one
writer in this manner:
The purpose test really represents the furthest limit of the effect test,
and the ultimate question remains whether the aid produces an effect
which advances or inhibits religion, a result which obviously violates neu-
trality. The unstated premise of the purpose test is that aid which lacks a
secular purpose inevitably produces a religious effect. The presence of a sin-
gle primary secular goal removes a scheme of aid from this pure case and
ushers it past the first element of the Supreme Court's test regardless of
any sectarian purposes which also might be present.
Comment, A Workable Definition of the Establishment Clause: Allen v. Morton
Raises New Questions, 62 GEo. L.J. 1461, 1464-65 (1974).
53 Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 389 A.2d 944, 954 (N.J.
1978). This sentiment has been expressed by the Supreme Court on a number of
occasions. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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Concluding that "the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schoolrooms has no secular legislative purpose,"" the
majority of the Court dismissed the avowed secular legislative
purpose as mere contrivance.5 5 Justice Rehnquist, in his dis-
sent in Stone, correctly noted that the "Court's summary re-
jection of a secular purpose articulated by the legislature and
confirmed by the state court is without precedent in establish-
ment clause jurisprudence." 58
The majority in Stone rationalized this circumvention of
the articulated purpose of the Kentucky legislature primarily
by use of the Schempp decision. As the Court correctly noted,
the school district involved in Schempp argued that the man-
dated religious exercises reflected secular motivations, such as
the promotion of moral and ethical values.57 A fundamental
difference is evident, however, between the Schempp and
Stone fact patterns in that the statute in Schempp mani-
fested no secular purpose on its face,58 whereas the Ten Com-
mandments Act expressly stated a secular purpose. 59 This dif-
ference goes further than the mere timing of the articulation
of the secular purpose, however, and merits a more exhaustive
inquiry into legislative intent than the Court afforded the Ten
Commandments Act in Stone.60
Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980) (emphasis
added).
I' Id. See note 11 supra for the text of KRS § 158.178(2), which contains the
purpose of the statute.
" Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3370 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
17 Id. at 3369.
" Furthermore, some justices in Schempp and in Epperson, the other establish-
ment clause case decided under the secular purpose test, felt that a secular purpose
was arguably present even though none was contained on the face of the statute it-
self. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
"I See note 11 supra for the text of the statute. Particular attention is directed
toward KRS § 158.178(2).
60 In response to Justice Rehnquist's recitation of such cases as Nyquist and
Lemon, wherein the court had deferred to legislative assertions of secular purpose,
the majority in Stone distinguished these cases as having a clear secular purpose
since they involved government aid to parochial schools. Stone v. Graham, 49
U.S.L.W. 3369, 3370 n.5 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980). Such a distinction is extremely fragile.
While such a difference may be probative of legislative intent where no purpose is
expressed, such full reliance on the distinction in the face of a formulated secular
1980-81]
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Several factors seriously militate against reliance upon
the secular purpose test in Stone. One factor is the enormous
proof problems which inhere in such an inquiry. As the Court
has noted: "inquiries into congressional motives or purposes
are a hazardous matter,"6 1 and any decision resting solely
upon such a difficult examination will thereby be weakened in
terms of clarity and forcefulness. 62 Though such practical
complexities obviously should not serve as an impenetrable
barrier in such a vital area as establishment clause jurispru-
dence, the insight of one commentator on this matter is in-
structive and sound: "Where a court can support a judgment
invalidating a decision on grounds other than unconstitutional
motivation, it usually should do so. ' 6s
An additional problem in Stone surfaces with regard to
the Court's discussion of the religiousness of the Decalogue.
After justifying its action by the use of Schempp, the Court
reinforces its position by asserting the essentially religious
character of the Ten Commandments." Such an analysis has
two serious flaws. First, the nature of a legislative action
should not be viewed as determinative of the motivation be-
hind such an action. While an inquiry into the nature of the
Decalogue could perhaps be probative of legislative purpose,
especially if no purpose has been formulated, such an inquiry
should not be viewed as dispositive of the purpose issue where
the statute's drafters expressed a contrary intent. Second, the
Decalogue arguably possesses secular ramifications, a fact
seemingly ignored by the Court. While it is true that the Dec-
alogue is a sacred text, it is equally undeniable that "the Ten
Commandments have had a significant impact on the develop-
motivation is unconvincing.
"1 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). For a perceptive and ex-
haustive discussion of the difficulties inherent in legislative motivation inquiries, see
Brest, supra note 49, at 116-30; Ely, supra note 49, at 1212-17.
62 This is especially true in a situation such as that in Stone, in which the Court
did not give the case plenary consideration. As Justice Rehnquist observed, the
Court's conclusions were supported only by "its own ipse dixit." Stone v. Graham, 49
U.S.L.W. 3369, 3370 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62 Brest, supra note 49, at 134.
Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980).
[Vol. 69
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ment of secular legal codes of the western world, 65 and evi-
dence to that effect was presented to the trial court. 6 As will
be noted later, the principal status of the Decalogue in Ameri-
can society is a religious one, 7 but the reality of its secular
impact lends weight to the argument that the expressed moti-
vation of the Kentucky legislature actually was the reason for
passage of the Ten Commandments Act.68
A final, prudential consideration that argues against the
course of action pursued in the Stone decision is the preserva-
tion of political capital. The Stone ruling comes at a point in
American history when the political climate has created the
very real potential for dangerous future assaults upon the reli-
gious autonomy protected by the establishment clause.6
Given such a political atmosphere, the Court should render
decisions involving religion with clarity and forceful, logical
analysis rather than with superficial conclusions supported by
"its own ipse dixit. ' 17 0 By taking the former course of action,
65 Id. at 3370 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"6 Brief of Amicus Curiae Kentucky Heritage Foundation at 11, 599 S.W.2d 157
(Ky. 1980). A number of commentators have expounded upon the interrelationship
between the Decalogue and Western legal evolution. See Edles, Biblical Parallels in
American Law, 84 CASE & CoMMENT No. 1 at 10, 11 (1979); Radin, Solving Problems
by Statute, 14 ORE. L. REv. 90 (1934).
67 See notes 73-84 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the religious
nature of the Decalogue and its perception as essentially a religious symbol.
The Court's cavalier rejection of any secular purpose behind the Ten Com-
mandments Act is also puzzling in light of the Court's refusal to review another es-
tablishment clause case just prior to Stone. In Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 464
F. Supp. 911 (D.S.D. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1980), both the trial court and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit upheld the use in the public schools of religious symbols and activ-
ities in observance of religious holidays. The court ruled that these observances were
sufficiently integrated into the school curriculum and accepted the regulation's
avowed secular purpose of enriching the educational experience of the students.
The Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Florey seems inconsistent with
its analysis in Stone. While it can be persuasively argued that the activities in Florey
were of a different nature and served a more secular function than the use of the
Decalogue in Stone, it is inconsistent to argue that the purpose behind the regula-
tions in Florey is clearly secular while at the same time implying that the avowed
purpose in Stone is only an inept contrivance.
11 See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this political
situation.




the Court could enhance its public stature, conserving politi-
cal capital for difficult decisions that may lie ahead. Unfortu-
nately, this avenue was not taken in the Stone ruling. While
its decision may have reached a proper result, the Court's
frontal attack upon the veracity of Kentucky's legislators will
not endear the justices to the legislators or to the public.
The factors discussed in the above analysis lead to the
conclusion that the Supreme Court's use of the secular pur-
pose test in Stone constitutes a serious weakness in that deci-
sion. The Court's unsupported declaration that no secular
purpose existed seems an unnecessary and injudicious disre-
gard of legislative authority, and the categorical denial of the
secular impact of the Decalogue appears unsound and super-
ficial. The Court's method resulted in an opinion lacking the
breadth and persuasiveness needed at this stage in the juris-
prudence of religion. This result could have been avoided by
reliance upon the broader and firmer legal grounds of the bal-
ance of the Lemon test.
III. PRIMARY EFFECT WHICH NEITHER ADVANCES NOR
INHIBITS RELIGION
7 1
The primary effect standard first articulated in Schempp
has proven extremely damaging to laws suspect as violations
of the establishment clause. In its effort to preserve the long-
cherished goal of state neutrality in matters of religion, 2 the
Supreme Court has been vigilant in its implementation of this
aspect of the Lemon test. Reliance upon the primary effect
test would have provided the Court in Stone with a much
7'1 Since the primary effect and entanglement standards of the Lemon test were
devised from a search for neutrality springing from the recognized need for accommo-
dation in this area (see notes 18-43 supra and accompanying text for a sketch of this
development), there is extensive interaction and overlap between these two criteria.
Thus, judicial opinions in this area are not totally consistent in that various consider-
ations may from time to time be used under the rubric of both these standards. For
this reason, the analysis of Stone under the primary effect and entanglement theories
found in this comment should be viewed only as a proposed model adaptable to this
particular fact pattern rather than a universal analysis used throughout establish-
ment clause adjudication.
712 See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this neutral-
ity doctrine and its origins.
[Vol. 69
TEN COMMANDMENTS CASE
more flexible and suitable analytical framework through
which to examine the Ten Commandments Act than that pro-
vided by use of the secular purpose standard. Analysis of
Stone under this prong of the tripartite test will focus on
three issues: (1) the religious nature of the Ten Command-
ments, (2) the integration of the Decalogue into the school
curriculum, and (3) the Court's functional definition of the
term "primary effect."
A. Religious Nature of the Ten Commandments
In order to recognize instances of state actions advancing
religion, it is essential at the outset to construct an interpre-
tation of the word "religion." The initial attempt by the Su-
preme Court to craft such a definition for first amendment
purposes came in Davis v. Beason,7 3 where the following stan-
dard was articulated:
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to
his wil.... The first amendment to the Constitution...
was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the
United States to entertain such notions respecting his rela-
tions to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be
approved by his judgment and conscience .... 74
The Court subsequently expanded this definition in a number
of decisions, many of which focused on free exercise claims,7 5
but the conventional concept of religion as expounded in Da-
vis has remained a focal point in establishment clause cases.7 6
Given this definition of religion, it can hardly be denied
that the Decalogue is inherently a religious document. Al-
73 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
74 Id. at 342.
7' See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
76 Even the commentators who argue for a more expansive definition of religion
for free exercise clause purposes still support the Davis standard in establishment
clause situations. See TRmE, supra note 16, at 826-33; Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HRv. L. REv. 1056, 1087 (1978).
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though the Ten Commandments do have secular ramifications
that could provide the motivation for enactment of a law such
as the Ten Commandments Act,7" the religiousness of the
Decalogue cannot be ignored or underestimated when examin-
ing its effect on American society. Several distinguished theo-
logians and commentators have expounded upon the religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, 8 and the divine
edicts found in the first part of the Decalogue fall squarely
within the area of the relations of man "to his Maker" set
forth in Davis.79 Many children undoubtedly first came into
contact with the Decalogue in the context of organized reli-
gious instruction outside the schoolroom, and it would be
absurd not to expect that the child's awareness of the Ten
Commandments in that religious environment would strongly
influence the child's perception in a public classroom as well.
Perhaps even more crucial is the public perception of the
Decalogue. The effect of any such document will be deter-
mined primarily by the manner in which the public perceives
it, and recognition of this public perception by the Court in
Stone would have been much more persuasive than was its
clumsy attempt to find a non-secular purpose based on its
characterization of the Decalogue as a purely religious object.
This public perception of the Decalogue as a religious symbol
was noted by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.80 Anderson involved the
constitutionality of the erection of a granite monolith upon
7 See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the secular
ramifications of the Decalogue.
78 E.g., KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN (1974).
71 The first three commandments read as follows:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above,
or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth:
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord
thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children onto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; And
shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my com-
mandments. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for
the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain. Remem-
ber the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Exodus 20:3-8.
80 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973).
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which the Ten Commandments were inscribed, along with
other religious and non-religious symbols. The court allowed
the monolith to remain, finding the Ten Commandments to
involve both secular and religious connotations and further
finding that the use of the Decalogue on the monolith was pri-
marily for historical purposes.8 1 In the process of its decision,
however, the court observed "that a large portion of our popu-
lation believes they [the Ten Commandments] are Bible
based., 8 2
This perception of the Decalogue as an essentially reli-
gious document is further underscored by the furor that arose
over the decision as to which version of the Decalogue should
be placed in Kentucky classrooms pursuant to the Ten Com-
mandments Act. In determining that the primary effect of
Bible readings in public classrooms was a religious one, the
Court in Schempp pointed to the use of alternative versions
of the Bible in concluding that the Scriptures were predomi-
nantly religious in nature.8 3 Stone presented an analogous
situation. As pointed out by a dissenting justice on the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, when a committee of religious leaders
met to decide upon the official version of the Decalogue to be
placed in the classrooms, so much dissension and disagree-
ment resulted that the group failed to fulfill its purpose.8
This failure highlights the perception of the Decalogue as a
religious symbol of the highest order.
B. Curriculum Integration of the Ten Commandments
Throughout its early pronouncements forbidding the
practice of various religious exercises in the public classrooms,
the Supreme Court took great pains to indicate that its deci-
sions did not mandate complete banishment of any mention
of the Bible or religion in the schools. As long as religious
matters were integrated into the curriculum in an objective,
neutral and educational manner, the Court observed, such
81 Id. at 34.
,2 Id. at 33.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
U Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Ky. 1980) (Lukowsky, J., dissenting).
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practices would be both acceptable and desirable. Justice
Clark's majority opinion in Schempp clearly evinces this
sentiment:
In addition, it might well be said that one's education is
not complete without a study of comparative religion or the
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy
of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we
have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular pro-
gram of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment. ss
Although the Court has not further refined the idea of
curriculum integration, this concept has become a major bat-
tleground in establishment clause litigation. 6 This issue re-
quires a more rigorous analysis than that found in the earlier
cases involving religious activities in public schools, and the
recent increase in the use of this curriculum integration con-
cept in establishment clause litigation indicates the likelihood
that the Court will have more to say on the issue in the near
future. Given these developments, it is unfortunate that the
Stone decision did not give closer attention to this concept. 7
Unlike prayer and daily Bible readings, the arguably secular
ramifications of the Decalogue and its relatively neutral place-
ment in the classroom provide a fact pattern that represents
an action closer to curriculum integration than is found in any
other of the Court's establishment clause decisions. Thus,
Stone would have provided a convenient occasion for further
refinement of the doctrine.
88 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
8 For two recent examples of this development, see Wiley v. Franklin, 474 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 911
(D.S.D. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3351
(U.S. Nov. 11, 1980).
In Stone, the opinion of the Court briefly mentions that this was not a case
where the requisite curriculum integration existed. Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W.
3369, 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980). This cursory assertion, however, does not present the
more extensive explication that would have been desirable, and such incomplete anal-
ysis by the Court in an opinion relying upon the secular purpose test bespeaks the
general incoherence of the opinion.
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Had the Court more closely examined the curriculum in-
tegration issue, it probably would have found that the Ten
Commandments Act provided for insufficient integration. The
actual opinion of the Court, however, only tersely expressed
this conclusion.88 Most students would probably pay little at-
tention to the "small print" assertion of the secular applica-
tion of the Decalogue.8 9 In order to overcome the public per-
ception of the Decalogue as a purely religious document,90 the
posting of the Decalogue would have to be accompanied by a
verbal, instructive explication of its secular impact. As the
Court noted in Stone, the mere posting of the Ten Command-
ments would have the effect only of inducing "the school chil-
dren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey,
the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a
matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objec-
tive under the Establishment Clause." 91
C. The Court's Functional Definition of the Term "Primary
Effect"
Due to the complexity of the issues often presented in
establishment clause cases, the laws involved often have mul-
tiple effects. As noted earlier,92 despite its predominantly reli-
gious nature, the Decalogue arguably may produce secular ef-
fects as well. Thus, it is imperative that the meaning of
"primary effect" be clearly identified.
49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980).
89 See note 11 supra for the text of KRS § 158.178(2), which required that a
statement of the "secular application of the Ten Commandments" be included on
each posted copy of the Decalogue.
,0 See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Deca-
logue as a religious creed.
91 Stone v. Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3369 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980). The role that
this concept of curriculum integration can play in a case like Stone was intimated by
Ring v. Grand Forks Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 483 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980). Faced
with a fact pattern nearly identical to that in Stone (the chief difference was that no
secular legislative purpose was expressed on the face of the North Dakota Statute),
the Court in Ring ruled that the avowed secular purpose was not being realized by
the posting of the Ten Commandments "without explanation, instruction or program
related to the document." Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
92 See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the secular
ramifications of the Decalogue.
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After a series of varying interpretations,93 the Court in
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist9 4 established the
current explication of "primary effect." In noting that a law
may have multiple effects, the Court concluded: "Our cases
simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a
'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end under the
State's police power is immune from further examination to
ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect
of advancing religion. '95 As one commentator noted, this pro-
nouncement has the expansive effect of requiring that any re-
ligious effect be remote or incidental in nature 6
Application of this Nyquist standard in Stone would have
been devastating to the Ten Commandments Act, leading in-
exorably to the conclusion that the statute created the imper-
missible primary effect of advancing religion. The Decalogue,
while producing some degree of secular effects, most certainly
transmits religious effects that are anything but remote or
incidental.
The primary effect test would have provided the Stone
court with a coherent and persuasive judicial instrument with
which to strike down the Ten Commandments Act. Prior
Court pronouncements concerning the definition of the term
"religion" and the proper use of religious objects in the class-
room, coupled with the Court's Nyquist explication of the
term "primary effect," lead to the conclusion that the statute
has an impermissible primary effect of advancing religion.
Application of this primary effect standard in Stone would
have produced a more thorough and appropriate discussion of
the meaning of the term religion, and the Court also could
have more fully delineated the concept of curriculum integra-
tion, an increasingly important facet of establishment clause
adjudication. Such action by the Court could have resulted in
a vigorous and forceful opinion reinforcing religious neutrality
in the public schools, thereby averting reliance on the secular
11 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
94 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
95 Id. at 783 n.39 (1973).
" TRIBE, supra note 16, at 840.
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purpose test and avoiding the resulting muddled analysis.
IV. EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENTAL ENTANGLEMENT WITH
RELIGION
97
In implementing the Lemon test, Chief Justice Burger
found exploration of three factors useful in discussing the en-
tanglement prong of the tripartite analysis: "the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority."9 8
Though specifically developed in the context of public aid to
parochial schools, these criteria can be adjusted somewhat to
provide a functional analytical structure through which appli-
cation of the entanglement test may proceed, an application
that could have provided a convenient forum in Stone for a
discussion of some of the more fundamental aspects of esta-
blishment clause jurisprudence.
A. Character and Purposes of the Benefited Institutions
Perhaps the most important consideration in the minds
of the Supreme Court justices in cases involving religion and
education has been the character and purpose of the public
school. The Court has never tolerated "laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom,"9 9 and throughout its establish-
ment clause adjudications the Court has frequently remarked
upon the dangerous impressionability of youth.100 This judi-
cial concern and its importance in litigation such as Stone was
perhaps best expressed by Professor Tribe:
Nothing could be more expressive of our society's commit-
ment to a particular religious practice than our willingness
to use, as a forum for that religion, the facilities through
which basic norms are transmitted to our young. It is thus
7 See note 71 supra for a discussion of the interaction and overlap between the
primary effect and excessive entanglement theories.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
100 See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 752 (1976); Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971); Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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unsurprising that no major religious activity, however "vol-
untary," has been allowed to take place in the facilities
through which we inculcate values for the future.110
These considerations obviously should weigh heavily in
any evaluation of a statute such as the Ten Commandments
Act. That a religious symbol such as the Decalogue is placed
in the environment of our public schoolrooms automatically
raises suspicions of excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion,10 2 and a firm acknowledgement of this in
Stone would have acutely underscored the Court's continued
vigilance in deterring any manifestation of indoctrination in
the province of public education.
B. Nature of the Aid Provided by the State
The nature of state assistance to religious activities in the
schools is of vital importance in determining both the primary
effect of the activity and any resulting entanglement between
government and religion. The Kentucky General Assembly
sought to circumvent the excessive entanglement problem by
requiring that the displayed copies of the Decalogue be pur-
chased by voluntarily contributed funds.103 The legislators
failed to recognize, however, that pure monetary assistance is
not the only form of governmental aid to religion proscribed
by the establishment clause. That non-monetary state assis-
tance is also prohibited is evident from examination of early
Court decisions involving the accomodation theory-decisions
that served as the catalyst for the eventual neutrality-oriented
101 TRIBE, supra note 16, at 825.
"02 This special judicial concern for the public schools may have been an impor-
tant factor in the decisions reached in a long line of rulings upholding the use of
religious symbols in public areas. Cf. Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(nativity scene in federal park adjacent to White House); Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973) (monument inscribed with Ten Commandments
on courthouse grounds); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1967), cert. denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968)
(light in shape of Latin cross on courthouse during Christmas season); Meyer v.
Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972) (large
Latin cross maintained on public property through tax revenues).
103 See note 11 supra for the text of KRS § 158.178(3), the private financing




As noted earlier, the Supreme Court distinguished Zorach
from its predecessor, McCollum, primarily by noting the dif-
fering degrees of involvement between the schools and the re-
ligious instruction in question.10 5 Though Justice Douglas ac-
knowledged that the state could to some degree accommodate
religious activities, his majority opinion in Zorach made it
clear that certain forms of state aid to religion were impermis-
sible. He declared the assistance in McCollum too excessive
because "the classrooms were used for religious instruction
and the force of the public schools was used to promote that
instruction." 10 6 This statement suggests that the area of pro-
scribed aid encompasses far more than the mere monetary
support contemplated by the Kentucky legislators; indeed, the
use of tax-supported physical structures themselves and their
administrative apparatus likewise appears to be prohibited.10 7
Inextricably coupled with this idea of governmental aid
by use of physical facilities is a more metaphysical, abstract
conception of assistance--the power and authority of the pub-
104 See notes 18-43 supra and accompanying text for a treatment of the develop-
ment of the Lemon test.
105 See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the McCol-
lum and Zorach decisions.
Two commentators have noted that the differing nature of the political environ-
ments at the time of these decisons may account for the different rulings. See L.
PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 191 (1975); T. WARSHAW, RELIGION,
EDUCATION AND THE SUPREME COURT 32 (1979). However, after receiving Supreme
Court reaffirmation as recently as Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975), the
Zorach rationale remains operative.
Furthermore, a great number of lower court decisions have relied on the McCol-
lum-Zorach reasoning in cases involving released-time programs or use of school
buildings for religious meetings. See Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo.
1979); Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1978); Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 434 U.S.
877 (1977); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (App. Div. 1978).
208 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
'07 This concern with the use of the machinery of the public schools to advance
religion was an important factor in a series of cases striking down the distribution of
Bibles in the schools. See Meltzer v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 577 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417
(E.D. Ark. 1973); Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181
(Fla. App. 1960), af'd, 155 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1963); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 100 A.2d
857 (N.J. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
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lic schools. Given the role played by schools in American so-
ciety,10 8 the observance of any religious activity within their
confines fosters the impression that the schools have thereby
stamped their imprimatur upon such activities. The Court
recognized this important form of governmental assistance
and its accompanying coercive results in the landmark deci-
sion of Engel v. Vitale:109 "When the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved re-
ligion is plain." 0
Though briefly alluding to this concept,' the failure of
the Supreme Court in Stone to fully develop this idea within
the proper parameters of the primary effect or excessive en-
tanglement tests constitutes a failure to further refine and ac-
centuate this vital facet of establishment clause jurisprudence.
The excessive entanglement of governmental assistance to re-
ligion that inheres in the Ten Commandments Act plays a
crucial role in the overall effect of advancing religion. Place-
ment of the authority inherent in the public schools behind
the Decalogue can only lead to a greater respect or veneration
for the Christian religion on the part of the students. However
desirable one may view this result on an individual plane,
such a consequence constitutes an unacceptable contravention
of the neutrality mandated by the first amendment." 2
C. Relationship Between Government and Religious
Authority
An additional aspect of the entanglement analysis which
could have been utilized persuasively by the Supreme Court
108 See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the impor-
tance of the public school environment in establishment clause cases.
109 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
110 Id. at 431.
" The Court briefly acknowledged this concept of the Engel decision. Stone v.
Graham, 49 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3370 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1980). This fleeting reference to an
important establishment clause consideration contributes to the clumsiness of the
decision.
12 See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the neutral-
ity doctrine and its origins.
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in Stone concerns the risks of impermissible action involved
in government-religion relationships. In examining the rela-
tionship between governmental and religious authorities in
establishment clause cases, the Court's analysis has been
colored constantly by the concept of potentiality. The Court
frequently has observed that the first amendment forbids any
law respecting an establishment of religion, 13 thus requiring
close scrutiny of the potential for undue involvement between
religion and public education in each case.
In this regard the duration of church-state contacts often
proves decisive in determining potential establishment clause
contraventions.114 Continuous and long-term contacts obvi-
ously increase the risk of breaches of the neutrality that the
first amendment seeks to effect. The Ten Commandments Act
poses this very risk. Given the sensitive role played by public
schools,1 1 5 the concern connected with the idea of potentiality
should be intensified in such cases. The permanent display of
the Decalogue in the public classrooms that the Ten Com-
mandments Act envisions would serve to foster a long-term
relationship between religion and public education, a relation-
ship that heightens the potential for further, more damaging
unconstitutional involvement in the future."' 6
IS E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961).
1,4 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 619 (1971). The importance of the duration of the religion-government contacts
probably can be viewed as determinative in a group of cases upholding the temporary
use of religious symbols in the public schools. See Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist.,
464 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.S.D. 1979), affl'd, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, *49
U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1980); Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Baer v. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
115 See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the impor-
tance of the public school environment in establishment clause adjudication.
116 Though it has been criticized by many commentators (for a recent, well-rea-
soned article to this effect, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines:
The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980)), an additional consideration under the entanglement test
was proffered by Lemon, namely the potential for political divisiveness. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). The thought involved is that political fragmenta-
tion and divisiveness along religious lines is an undesirable occurrence, and any law
likely to result in such a dispute quite possibly entails excessive church-state entan-
glement. In this regard the widespread negative reaction to the Supreme Court's deci-




As Justice Holmes so cogently observed, the Constitution
"is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."""7 It is an ex-
perimental attempt to form a republic in which the necessary
ingredients for a cohesive and organized society are main-
tained, while at the same time sustaining individual auton-
omy. As American society becomes increasingly complex, the
danger of encroachment upon individual autonomy intensifies.
Thus, no greater and more crucial challenge confronts the
United States Supreme Court than does the defense of this
cherished autonomy from external assault.
In light of the central role religion plays in the lives of
individuals and in society generally,"" perhaps no facet of
human autonomy is more deserving of judicial guardianship
than is religious self-determination. The sectarian autonomy
envisioned by the first amendment necessarily contemplates a
freedom from any form of religious hegemony and from indoc-
trination in a governmental province such as the public
schools. Such freedom undoubtedly requires a judiciary that
will not retreat from its responsibility of enforcing state neu-
trality in matters of religion.
Although the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Stone v. Graham properly reversed a Kentucky Supreme
Court decision that had given a victory to forces hostile to
governmental neutrality in matters of religion, the United
States Supreme Court's opinion is disappointing. Reliance
upon the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is the opin-
ion's major weakness,11 9 as evinced by the above analysis of
Stone under the primary effect and excessive entanglement
standards.1 20 The Court's unsupported and arguably incorrect
assertions concerning legislative motivation are surprising in
public outrage to Stone, see the letters to the editor in The Courier-Journal, Dec. 29,
1980, § A, at 6.
, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"s See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text for a description of the impor-
tance of religion.
119 See notes 54-70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect
of the Stone decision.
120 See notes 71-116 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the pos-
sibilities in Stone for use of these strands of the tripartite test.
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light of the relatively minor role played by such an inquiry in
past establishment clause cases.12 1 Moreover, the more sub-
stantive and fundamental considerations involved in the latter
two prongs of the tripartite test would have provided the
Court with a more logically-secure foundation for its decision,
while simultaneously avoiding casting doubt upon the good
faith of the Kentucky General Assembly.
The Stone opinion is even more regrettable in the face of
the current political atmosphere. While the term "conserva-
tive revolution" is much overused, such a concept does convey
the general drift in America today toward more traditional
values. As might be expected, such a philosophical movement
carries with it the impulse of a "moral majority" to impose its
perceptions and notions of divine truth upon society as a
whole. These impulses have already manifested themselves in
religious-oriented legislative enactments, 2' and such actions
seem likely to proliferate in the future.
As some have noted, the current political climate makes
more likely a serious constitutional clash between the judicial
and legislative branches in the near future. 2 The Stone case
provided the Court with an opportunity to lessen the possibil-
ity of such an undesirable intergovernmental confrontation.
Instead, the Court's ruling diminished its political capital1 2 4
and provided a muddled and unconvincing rejection of the use
of religious symbols in public classrooms. One scholar has sug-
gested that the justices in Stone were attempting to discour-
age any "chiseling away at the perimeters" of its church-state
doctrine.1 25 It is regrettable, however, that, in preserving its
existing body of establishment clause jurisprudence, the Court
emphasized the relatively unimportant secular purpose test
"I See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this develop-
ment of establishment clause jurisprudence.
122 A recent example of this was Senator Helms' effort in 1979 to amend the
Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act (S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.) to include a provision
removing all jurisdiction from the federal courts to hear challenges to voluntary
school prayer programs. S. 438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
,23TIME, Dec. 1, 1980, at 74.
" See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this possible
depletion of political capital.
,25TIME, Dec. 1, 1980, at 74 (quoting Professor Jesse Choper).
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while ignoring direct treatment of the other two prongs of the
Lemon test. In so doing, the Court "forfeited an opportunity to
advance and clarify this vital and potentially explosive area of
constitutional law.
J. David Smith, Jr.
